

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Alphonse Maldon to Howard Paster at 14:11:00.00. Subject: U.N. Resolution on Somalia. (1 page)	03/29/1993	P5
002. email	Alphonse Maldon to Howard Paster, Timothy Keating, and Lorraine Miller at 20:02:00.00. Subject: S.J. 45 Somalia Resolution (1 page)	05/18/1993	P5
003. email	Alphonse Maldon to Howard Paster, Timothy Keating, Lorraine Miller, and Steve Ricchetti at 10:12:00.00. Subject: Briefing on Russia and Somalia to Congress today. (1 page)	10/05/1993	P5
004. email	Roderick VonLipsey to Fax at 15:35:00.00. Subject: Foreign/Security Policy Meme (2 pages)	10/25/1993	P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 Automated Records Management System (Email)
 WHO ([Somalia])
 OA/Box Number: 500000

FOLDER TITLE:

[03/29/1993 - 10/25/1993]

2006-1021-F
 ke2439

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

/BOM/RECORD TYPE: PRESIDENTIAL (RECONSTRUCTED EMAIL)

CREATOR: Alphonse Maldon (MALDON_A) (WHO)

CREATION DATE/TIME: 29-MAR-1993 14:11:00.00

SUBJECT: U.N. Resolution on Somalia

TO: Howard Paster (PASTER_H) (WHO)
READ: UNKNOWN

CC: Lorraine C. Miller (MILLER_L) (WHO)
READ: UNKNOWN

CC: Timothy J. Keating (KEATING_T) (WHO)
READ: UNKNOWN

CC: Susan Brophy (BROPHY_S) (WHO)
READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

Senator Nunn has expressed his concerns about the UN Resolution on Somalia and the use of U.S. Troops under UN control. Nunn, Dellums and others are interested in hearing the Administration's position on War Powers Act. Also, Mike O'Neil in the Speaker's office would like to know the WH views on the Hamilton Resolution. As you know, the Hamilton Resolution authorizes the use of U.S. Forces in Somalia. However, the UN Cooperation Act is probably in violation as it is now written. For instance, chapter 6 of the UN Cooperation Act authorizes a total of 1000 troops to be involved for peace keeping purpose. Our peacekeeping forces are already in excess of this number.

Jeremy Rosner and I have asked the State Department to review the UN Cooperation Act. NSC in conjunction with Bernie Nussbaum is currently relooking the War Powers Act and is expected to have a proposal for the president's approval within 2 weeks. Congress will then be notified of the Administration's position on the War Powers Act.

Sandy Berger is calling Frank Weisner and Peter Tarnoff today to inform them that NSC is currently reviewing the War Powers Act and that the State Department should be reviewing the UN Cooperation Act. Subsequent calls will be made to Debbie Lee, DOD and Wendy Sherman, State. In turn, both Debbie and Wendy will notify appropriate Chairs and Sub Chairs. This is for your information.

/EOM/

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ARMS Email System

Clinton Presidential Library Photocopy

RECORD TYPE: PRESIDENTIAL (RECONSTRUCTED EMAIL)

CREATOR: Alphonse Maldon (MALDON_A) (WHO)

CREATION DATE/TIME: 18-MAY-1993 20:02:00.00

SUBJECT: S.J. 45 Somalia Resolution

TO: Howard Paster (PASTER_H) (WHO)

READ: UNKNOWN

TO: Timothy J. Keating (KEATING_T) (WHO)

READ: UNKNOWN

TO: Lorraine C. Miller (MILLER_L) (WHO)

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

According to Rules cmte and the Leadership, S.J. 45 Somalia Resolution will likely go to the floor on Thursday, May 20, 1993. Resolution will be under restricted rules which will allow some amendments from Republican Members. Amendments will be voted on first and Hamilton's bill will follow. Whip count is being conducted and should be completed by noon tomorrow. Depending on the votes we may want to work to get some Republican votes to demonstrate bipartisan support for this national interest issue. If we get enough democratic votes to pass the resolution, Republican votes will be easier to influence. I believe we can work this with Republican leadership once we have enough votes.

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ARMS Email System

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RECORD TYPE: PRESIDENTIAL (RECONSTRUCTED EMAIL)

CREATOR: Alphonse Maldon (MALDON_A) (WHO)

CREATION DATE/TIME: 05-OCT-1993 10:12:00.00

SUBJECT: Briefing on Somalia and Russia to Congress today

TO: Howard Paster (PASTER_H) (WHO)
READ: UNKNOWN

TO: Timothy J. Keating (KEATING_T) (WHO)
READ: UNKNOWN

TO: Lorraine C. Miller (MILLER_L) (WHO)
READ: UNKNOWN

TO: Steve Ricchetti (RICCHETTI_S) (WHO)
READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

Howard, I think that it would be helpful if Aspin and Christopher were to call Sen Byrd today and try to talk him out of offering an amendment on the floor tomorrow to the defense appropriations bill to cut off funding for the Somalia operation and withdraw troops by Nov 15, 1993 unless Congress authorizes the operation in Somalia. I believe these calls would also be helpful in calming Byrd for the briefing today by Aspin and Christopher. Otherwise, I think we can expect Byrd to heavily influence Member's opinions to withdraw troops in this briefing today.

As you know, the President's report is due to Congress by October 15, 1993. I think we can anticipate questions from Members about this report today and I have informed State and DOD to make sure Christopher and Aspin was prepared to talk to the report.

Incidentally, I am informed that there is still quiet a bit of work to be done on OBJECTIVES and U.S. INTERESTS and in addressing Somalia POLITICALLY.

I have asked both DOD and State to have the Secys make calls to Byrd before the briefing.

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RECORD TYPE: PRESIDENTIAL (RECONSTRUCTED EMAIL)

CREATOR: Roderick K. VonLipsey (VONLIPSEY_R) (WHO)

CREATION DATE/TIME: 25-OCT-1993 15:35:00.00

SUBJECT: FOREIGN / SECURITY POLICY MEME

TO: FAX (9-703-697-0180, MS. KORI SCHAKE (TLXA1MAIL_\F:9-703-697-0180\C:MS. KORI SC
READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

PRINTER FONT 12_POINT_COURIER
October 25, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: ROD VON LIPSEY

SUBJECT: FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVE

I. SUMMARY: Much of the recent media coverage insinuates that the administration lacks viable foreign and security policies. Clear and coherent statements of national interest and policy objectives by senior administration officials can prevent further spread of this perception. Without clear articulation of these, the POTUS' ability to secure NAFTA; conclude GATT; engage APEC, EC, Russian and East-Central European leaders; trim defense spending; and deploy U.S. forces in the future is put at risk.

II. DISCUSSION: Several "October surprises" turned national attention away from Health Care and RIGO, and focused it on the status of foreign and security policy. The prevalent media perception has been that the administration lacks viable foreign and security policies. To avoid allowing this perception to become reality, the administration should take active steps to clarify policies and prevent further media second-guessing.

When the media questioned our backing of Boris Yeltsin, our clear statement of support for Yeltsin's stewardship over the process of democratic reform in Russia, and POTUS' masterful lobbying of the G-7 leaders' timely support, did much to quickly defuse the issue. On Bosnia, Haiti and Somalia, however, the policy and objectives have not been as clearly articulated. Rather, various administration officials have expressed slightly different views of our policy objectives in these areas. As a result, for example, while the administration sought to de-personalize its support for elected leadership in Haiti, the media focused on the mental stability of President Aristide. The issue became, not restoring democracy, but restoring Aristide. Clear, concise, (and repeated) statements of our policy vis-a-vis Haiti could have precluded this.

Difficulty in communicating foreign policy objectives has had a domestic spillover. NAFTA appears threatened by an isolationist sentiment fanned by the conundrum. Thus, the POTUS risks a visit to the APEC Conference with a NAFTA defeat, followed by a Russia/East-Central Europe visit with simmering problems in the U.S.'s "Near-Abroad," Haiti. A new strategy is needed to quickly regain the domestic initiative: We must clearly, coherently and forcefully state our present and future foreign and security policy objectives -- and relate these to domestic security initiatives such as NAFTA and the Economy.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS: (1) Provide guidelines or talking points to all cabinet officials which clearly outline our interest in,

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and policy toward Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti. (2) Task the interagency with providing clear statements of our "next steps" in Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti. Although classified, these should clearly articulate the administration's conditions for, and purpose of, military participation in these regions. (3) Convene a working group to define, in plain language, the administration's overarching foreign and security policy objectives, and finally (4) Relate these objectives to an overall Presidential strategy which includes NAFTA, Health Care Reform, the Crime Bill and Deficit Reduction. I am sure that I have stated the obvious here, however, would be happy to visit with you on this, your schedule permitting.

Very respectfully.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Clarke, Richard A. to Soderberg, Nancy et al. re: 30 April: Weekly Report (3 pages)	04/30/1993	P1/b(1)
002. email	Beers, Randy R. to Soderberg et al. re: VP Meeting... (1 page)	05/07/1993	P1/b(1)
003. email	Clarke to Emery, Mary C. et al. re: [Tarnoff Meeting] (1 page)	06/30/1993	P1/b(1)
004. email	Clarke to Steinberg, Donald K. et al. re: Somalia-Sitrep... (2 pages)	10/04/1993	P1/b(1)
005. email	Darragh, Sean J. to Beers/Rice, Susan E. re: Somalia Update (1 page)	01/06/1994	P1/b(1)
006. email	Beers to Satterfield, David M. re: Somalia, for Comment ASAP (3 pages)	03/03/1994	P1/b(1)
007. email	Clarke to Bleicken, Neil G. re: *** FYI (2 pages)	03/29/1994	P1/b(1)
008. email	Clarke to Kenny, Kristie A. re: Presidential Question (2 pages)	03/31/1994	P1/b(1)
009. email	Clarke to Emery et al. re: Somalia Situation Report (2 pages)	04/21/1994	P1/b(1)
010. email	Bell, Robert G. to Soderberg re: Scheduling Medals of Honor (2 pages)	05/09/1994	P1/b(1)
011. email	Keith Hahn to Anthony Lake, re: Notes from June 12 Meeting with Joyce/Smith/Pilla (2 pages)	05/18/1994	P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 A1-Record (Jan 93-Sept 94) ([Intelligence and Somalia...])
 OA/Box Number: 570000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/30/1993-05/18/1994]

2006-1021-F
eh548

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

18-May-1994 11:51 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

W. Anthony K. Lake

(LAKE)

FROM:

Keith D. Hahn
(HAHN)

SUBJECT:

Notes from June 12 Meeting with Joyce/Smith/Pilla Fa

Mr. Joyce set the context for the discussion on the decision to launch a raid on the building believed to be holding Aideed.

Joyce: In late summer and early fall we were making good progress toward a diplomatic solution. Why did we launch a raid to capture Aideed?

President: It's true that we had made good progress by mid-August through the efforts of former President Carter to reach a diplomatic solution. And by mid-September we thought we could start drawing back a bit. I knew we had good intelligence that indicated we could take some of the people who killed the Pakistani soldiers off the street, but I was surprised when I heard about the raid.

Mrs. DeAnna Joyce (daughter): Do you mean you had no knowledge of the decision to launch the raid?

President: No, I did not. We learned from LBJ's experience in Vietnam that decisions of that type should not be made from Washington. They need to be made by the commander on the scene. General Hoar was given broad general guidance and he, in turn, passed tactical decisionmaking authority to the commander in Somalia -- particularly those decisions that required a quick response. Aideed was moving around very quickly and he was hard to pin down. So, like you, I was surprised to hear of the raid and saddened when I heard of the casualties.

The President then reiterated his belief that the U.S. should not have been the police force in Somalia. Joyce stated that he thought that there were two separate command and control structures in Somalia that didn't talk to each other -- the U.S. and the UN.

Lake: You can make the argument that this battle pressured Aideed to seek a political solution after all. Your sons may have saved U.S. lives through this battle.

Richard Clarke, sitting in the back, was in a better position to take exhaustive notes. I will check to see what he has when he returns. Hope this provides some clarification.

v/r, Keith

CC: Records (RECORDS)
CC: Neal S. Wolin (WOLIN)
CC: Robert G. Bell (BELL)
CC: Wilma G. Hall (HALL)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 18-May-1994 11:24
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 040712
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA16:ZVFNGXQLO.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 18-May-1994 11:51
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS